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The concept countering violent extremism (CVE) essentially incorporates initiatives 
that attempt to prevent people from becoming involved in terrorism and to limit reoffending 
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Abstract 
Indonesia has experimented with initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism 
(CVE) since the wave of arrests following the first Bali bombing attack in 2002. Initial 
efforts involved police attempting to develop relationships of trust with terrorists in 
custody. Today, a broader range of strategies are employed, from promoting peace 
among youth and thwarting the allure of extremist narratives, to managing prisoners 
and assisting former terrorists reintegrate with society. The lead government body 
since 2010 has been the national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), which is tasked with coordinating stakeholders 
in Indonesia’s struggle with domestic terrorism. But managing the divergent and 
sometimes competing interests of Indonesia’s large state institutions has not been 
straightforward, and effective collaboration between relevant state agencies remains an 
obstacle to the success of CVE initiatives. Where government has fallen short, civil 
society organisations (CSOs) often fill the gaps, and a number of dedicated 
practitioners now have invaluable experience, local contacts, and the specific 
knowledge required for countering extremism in the Indonesian context. CSOs also 
possess greater levels of trust among the communities they engage than security-
centric state agencies could possibly hope to achieve. Yet instead of exploiting these 
civil society resources, the BNPT has largely preferred an independent (and top-down) 
approach to CVE initiatives, collaborating if and when assistance is required. The 
Indonesian government should make better use of the unique legitimacy and expertise 













among those who have already committed crimes. Given the broad gamut of conceivable 
programmes associated with these goals, CVE has been criticised for being unhelpfully 
ambiguous, involving anything from promoting critical thought in schools to helping former 
convicts find stable employment. Yet the violent extremism many nations now face poses a 
complex set of problems which requires creative, multi-stakeholder, contextualised responses. 
An effective strategy should be wide-ranging enough to address any contributing ingredient of 
a given individual’s trajectory toward violence. 
Researchers and practitioners have recently provided a degree of clarity through a 
prevention model framework, which was initially developed as a public health instrument 
(Caplan 1964) but has since been adopted by national counterterrorism strategies in different 
countries (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit 2016; Williams, Horgan & Evans 2016; Korn 
2016; Selim 2016; Hemmingsen 2015). CVE is thereby divided into three levels of emphasis: 
Primary preventions aim to dissuade the general population from becoming attracted to 
extremist narratives, and particularly those who may be susceptible to influence. Secondary 
interventions more specifically target those identified as having concerning views and may be 
treading a pathway to violence. And tertiary interventions manage individuals who have been 
involved in violence and are now either in prison or reintegrating with society.  
Basing a model for addressing political violence on a framework originally designed 
for disease control is contentious, however, as it appears to imply that violent extremism is an 
illness which may be treated with the correct medication (Koehler 2017: 114). In recent years 
there have been cases of assailants with mental health issues, but arguments that 
psychological disorders lie at the heart of terrorist motivation have been well and truly put to 
rest (see Lord Alderdice 2007; Silke 2008). Whether or not the model is appropriate or 
sufficient for formulating a national CVE plan is up for debate, but for now it remains a useful 
lens through which to view projects that are already underway. This report employs the 
prevention model to examine CVE efforts in Indonesia.  
Various initiatives have been established by Indonesian state agencies and civil society 












cohesive direction. While there are signs that stakeholders are willing to collaborate and share 
best practices, the national counterterrorism agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Terorisme, BNPT) may be more effective if it assumed the coordinating role it was originally 
mandated to occupy. Instead the BNPT has initiated its own CVE programmes, which many 
observers perceive to be top-down, fragmented and lacking consistent commitment. Civil 
society organisations, meanwhile, have strong grass-roots networks, hands-on experience, and 




Findings are based on 18 semi-structured interviews with civil society organisation 
representatives working on CVE in Indonesia, relevant government officials, and independent 
researchers in Jakarta in late 2016. Interviews ran roughly one hour in length and were held at 
the offices of project participants or in public places deemed more suitable. Conversations 
were recorded and transcribed by the author and material deemed relevant to the present study 
was taken from this data. Some of those involved wished to remain anonymous, citing the 
sensitive nature of the subject and the dynamic between state and non-state actors. The 
research was granted ethics approval by the International Review Board (IRB) at Nanyang 
Technological University (NTU) in Singapore and received permission to conduct interviews 
from the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology (RISTEK).  
An important caveat to note is this report does not attempt to evaluate the efficacy of a 
given CVE project in Indonesia. Programme assessments are vital, and while it may be 
difficult to prove that an act did not occur because of a particular course of intervention, area 
experts have made valuable contributions outlining how evaluations may be conducted 
effectively (See Williams & Kleinman 2014; Williams, Horgan & Evans 2016; Horgan & 
Braddock 2010). However, systematic assessments of specific programmes were beyond the 
scope of this project, which instead sought to identify the respective approaches to CVE taken 

















The literature on how and why people leave terrorist networks and what may be done 
to promote this process is relatively young, but in recent years a number of important studies 
have built on the body of knowledge. Initially, debate focused on whether prison-based 
rehabilitation initiatives should aim for the ‘de-radicalisation’ of subjects or whether their 
‘disengagement’ from violence might be a sufficient goal (see Horgan 2008; Silke 2011; 
Della Porta & LaFree 2012). Proponents of the former consider the root of an imprisoned 
militant’s motivation for subversive violence to be essentially ideological and argue that 
interventions must involve the dismantling of his or her worldview and the reconstruction of a 
mindset more conducive to loyal citizenship (Rabasa et al 2010; Gunaratna 2011; Al-Hadlaq 
2011). For others, attempting to argue away political or religious convictions is an overly 
ambitious approach to rehabilitation, while a more realistic pursuit is to focus on practical 
goals such as disengaging individuals from their militant networks and their support for 
political violence (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan & Braddock 2010; Silke 2011). 
Employing a persuasive intervention strategy intent on ideological change may even 
prove counterproductive. In a review of studies investigating individual exit from violent 
extremist groups, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen drew upon social psychology research to highlight 
the resistance often faced by persuasive approaches to de-radicalisation (2013: 107). When an 
individual has internalised a conviction that helps to shape his or her self-perceived identity, 
attempts to challenge or disprove the underlying ideas will generate a defensive posture which 
may break down the intended engagement. Both Dalgaard-Nielsen and Kurt Braddock (2014) 
evoke the theory of psychological reactance developed by Jack Brehm in the 1960s to 
illustrate unintended potential outcomes of de-radicalisation efforts. Brehm’s prominent claim 
is that arguments which threaten an individual’s freedom of thought can result in a heightened 












(Brehm 1966: 16). Attempted persuasion may further entrench the very ideas interventions 
seek to discredit. 
With consensus forming among scholars that rehabilitation strategies need not be 
driven by ideological counterargument, research has attempted to identify the specific reasons 
people have disengaged from violent extremist groups. A study by Altier et al (2017) 
analysed the autobiographical accounts of 87 individuals, focusing on their trajectory of 
involvement with a broad range of organisations that have employed terrorism as a tactic. The 
research found push rather than pull factors were more commonly attributed to initial exit 
decisions; particularly disillusionment with the group’s strategy, tactics, or leadership, and the 
day-to-day obligations of membership (Altier et al 2017: 330). Kate Barrelle (2015) produced 
similar findings in a series of in-depth interviews with 22 former extremists (both violent and 
non-violent). Disillusionment with leaders and fellow group members was indicated as the 
most prominent reason for leaving, followed by physical and/or psychological burnout 
(Barrelle 2015: 132). In a voluminous literature review on the subject, Daniel Koehler also 
found “wide agreement” that disillusionment and burnout were among the most determinant 
factors in decisions to leave terrorist organisations (2017: 51). 
Another project by Harris et al (2017) investigated personal reasons for 
disengagement through interviews with 27 participants who had left a diverse range of 
ideological groups. The study showed that negative intra-group dynamics can prompt 
individuals to weigh their expectations of joining against the reality of membership, which 
may then erode their sense of belonging and lead to a process of disidentification from the 
group (Harris et al 2017: 17). The authors argue that CVE interventions should address 
ideology only once a psychological process of disengagement from the group is well under 
way, and that a more effective approach may be for programmes to focus on relationship 
dynamics and the reforming of personal identities (Harris et al 2017: 17-18). 
While recent studies stress the primacy of push factors in early stages of 
disengagement, opportunities to pursue constructive goals may improve the chance an 












engagement somewhere else” and key to social reintegration is for people exiting ideological 
groups to find something else to identify with and a new place to belong (2015: 133). Starting 
or returning to a family may provide the requisite incentive to prioritise practical concerns in 
life such as securing comfortable accommodation and ensuring a good education for one’s 
children (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2013: 105). Studying, retraining or undertaking a business venture 
can assist in refocusing energy on individual pursuits rather than obligations to a group or 
movement, while the forming of new social relationships away from former associations is 
considered crucial for a sustained process of personal disengagement (Koehler 2016: 51; 




A study by Julie Chernov Hwang (2017) on the disengagement of militant jihadis in 
Indonesia came to similar conclusions as the research outlined above. From a series of 50 
interviews with current and former members of Islamist extremist groups, Chernov Hwang 
identified four prominent themes among those who had decided to quit: Disillusionment with 
leadership; an awareness that costs of action outweigh personal or movement-wide benefits; 
developing new friendships away from militant groups; and changes to personal ambitions 
such as furthering education, having children and providing for a family (2017: 278, 285-
286). An interesting and common caveat to the participants’ disengagement was its 
conditionality on the current status quo, which highlights the importance of macro 
considerations for decisions both to engage and disengage in political violence. Jihadis in Java 
said they would take up arms if Indonesia was invaded by a foreign power, while others stated 
a willingness to fight if sectarian conflict re-emerged in Central Sulawesi or Maluku province  
(Chernov Hwang 2017: 290). An earlier report on the same issue from Chernov Hwang et al 
stated that “Government programs, ad hoc and inconsistent as they are, play only a minor 
role” in individual decisions to disengage (2013: 755).  
Indonesian experiments with CVE-type endeavours date back to the early 2000s, when 












personal relationships (Martin 2007). While the principal aim was to gather intelligence, 
police developed what was termed a “cultural interrogation” approach, whereby officers 
displayed their own faith in Islam, treated detainees with respect and attempted to build trust 
(Rabasa et al 2010: 107-108). Engagements were incentivised through practical assistance for 
family members and rewards such as better meals in custody, VIP medical treatment, and 
even quiet words with judges and prosecutors to “negotiate” more forgiving sentences 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 13). Some of the cooperative prisoners became valuable 
interlocutors for police interventions, and began disseminating pragmatic arguments that the 
jihadi movement had made cost-benefit miscalculations in staging operations, and that 
indiscriminate bombings in Indonesia were unjustified in the present climate (Osman 2014: 
223). 
A problem for these police-led initiatives, however, was losing pre-trial detainees to 
the chaotically overcrowded prison system once they were sentenced. Deeply ingrained 
corruption in correctional institutions and soft enforcement of rules has made it easy for 
imprisoned terrorists to receive jihadi material from the outside, to interact with fellow 
militants, and more recently to communicate with the world via smartphones (Osman 2014: 
218; IPAC 2015a: 13). The ubiquity of bribery in prisons, from securing better services to 
simply moving around the compound, has strengthened the perception among jihadis that 
government officials are corrupt and thagout (violators of Shari’ah) (International Crisis 
Group 2007: i; Istiqomah 2011: 32; Osman 2014: 219).  
Suboptimal coordination between prison administration and security services has also 
posed problems. The underfunded correctional system has never been considered an intrinsic 
part of the criminal justice system, while law enforcement agencies have often deemed it 
expedient to focus on their own immediate concerns (Sulhin 2010: 4; Sudaryono 2013). 
Regarding counterterrorism, this has meant holding suspects in police cells for as long as 
possible and taking a selective approach to the sharing of information.  
In 2010, the national counterterrorism agency Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 












subsequent threats on the life of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Authorised 
under Presidential Decree 46/2010, the BNPT is an executive agency divided into three units 
or ‘deputies’: (1) Prevention, Protection and De-radicalisation; (2) Operations and 
Enforcement; and (3) International Cooperation. The BNPT has seen four leaders since its 
inception and by the end of 2016, the agency comprised a staff of roughly 300 people, with an 
annual operating budget of Rp.700 billion ($US54 million) (Tempo 14/08/16).  
In addition to forming a coordinating function, the establishment of the BNPT was 
seen as a way of providing a counterterrorism role for the Indonesian Military (TNI). The 
National Police (Polri) had been highly effective in thwarting attacks and dismantling terrorist 
networks, particularly through the work of its elite counterterrorism unit known as Densus 88 
(Special Detachment 88), which was set up in the years following the first Bali bombing in 
2002. This success ensured law enforcement would maintain an operational lead by directing 
deputy two. Diplomats were tasked with the international cooperation portfolio of deputy 
three, which left the CVE mandate of deputy one for the TNI (IPAC 2015b: 8).  
With the military in charge of prevention and de-radicalisation it is somewhat 
unsurprising that Indonesia’s founding state ideology of Pancasila (belief in one God, 
nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice, and democracy) features prominently in BNPT-
led CVE initiatives (Idris & Taufiqurrohman 2015: 71). In late 2016, Coordinating Minister 
for Political, Security and Legal Affairs, General Wiranto, stated at a press conference that 
Indonesians who supported the Islamic State would be re-educated so they possessed a strong 
sense of nationalism: “They will be made aware of their role as citizens responsible for 
maintaining the country’s security”, he said (Tempo 19/11/16). The BNPT approach also 
embraces the assertion that ideology lies at the heart of an individual’s decision to become 
involved in terrorism. The moderation of religious conviction is now considered central to 
state-led tertiary CVE interventions (See BNPT 2013).  
A small number of civil society organisations have taken a more personalised 
approach to CVE than the state, adopting pragmatic goals such as disengaging prisoners from 












Practical and social assistance is offered to facilitate the reintegration of former prisoners back 
into society, and civil society organisations conduct prevention work in schools and 
universities, where youth are engaged through activities and discussions to promote tolerance, 
diversity, and outlets for positive activism (Maarif Institute 2012; Search for Common 
Ground 2016).  
These organisations have largely been working in parallel to the state and receive little 
government direction or support. One promising initiative emerged in 2016, which is 
attempting to bring together key players from civil society working on CVE in Indonesia. 
Civil Society against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE) was established to pool the resources and 
experiences of 23 organisations onto a platform which hopes eventually to contribute to a 
national CVE strategy for Indonesia. C-SAVE’s mission is to “build and develop a national 
network of civil society organisations to promote synergy and effective performance in 
combating radicalism and violence” (C-SAVE 2016).  
Civil society practitioners in Indonesia generally deem labels such as CVE and 
(especially) ‘de-radicalisation’ to be unhelpful, as they are seen to securitise programmes 
more concerned with promoting constructive personal development than reminding people of 
their obligations to the state. The thinking goes that if audiences or individuals identified as 
being vulnerable to adopting extremist convictions believe interventions are premised on a 
perceived security threat, they will be less likely to participate actively. It is the ability to gain 
legitimacy and trust among the people they seek to engage which make civil society 
organisations potentially more suited to conducting CVE initiatives than security-mandated 




















Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme  
The BNPT’s central initiative to prevent radicalisation has been the creation of 
terrorism prevention forums in 32 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces from 2012.2 The Forum 
Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme (FKPT) was the brainchild of the first deputy one Head, 
Agus Surya Bakti, who sought to create the architecture for permanent regional forums first 
and work out how to fill in the substance once they were established. The forums broadly 
became talk-shops on terrorism, involving presentations and dialogue sessions between local 
government officials, academics, former police officers, and clerics from the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI) (See IPAC 2014). The BNPT and Police have also encouraged ‘de-
radicalised’ prisoners – such as repentant former Jemaah Islamiyah operatives, Ali Imron and 
Nasir Abbas – to speak at forums and public events.  
The majority of non-governmental stakeholders interviewed for the present study 
considered the FKPT to be disappointing and misdirected. A common criticism is that forums 
are too high level; largely involving regional elites in discussions intended to raise awareness 
of violent extremism rather than reaching people who may be prone to radicalisation, 
particularly the youth. FKPT ceremonies are often followed by press conferences with a 
certain degree of grandstanding and promises which observers believe fall short of addressing 
the pertinent issues.  
Taufik Andrie from the NGO, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), said instead of 
focusing on the regional level, the BNPT should conduct research to identify specific areas 
that are more prone to radicalism and then engage relevant people in local administrative 
associations, such as the desa (village) or rukun tetangga (neighbourhood group) levels of 
government. “In terms of terrorism mitigation and prevention”, Taufik explained, “You have 
to go to the small and deeper unit – family, mosques – simpler and smaller society. There’s no 
need to be provincial”. Rumadi Ahmad, former senior researcher at the Wahid Institute (a 
                                                 












Nahdlatul Ulama3 organisation), had concerns over the FKPT’s budget priorities and financial 
management. Regional forums mostly take place in expensive hotels, officials require high-
end motorcades, and there is a view among civil society stakeholders and researchers that 
money could be spent more effectively. 
 
Schools and Universities 
As mentioned above, the majority of prevention work directed at youth is conducted 
by non-governmental and civil society organisations. The Wahid Foundation, which is headed 
by Yenny Wahid (the daughter of former President Abdurrahman Wahid), began engaging 
students in 2008, initially focusing on schools in South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, East Java and 
West Java. In 2013, the foundation introduced a pilot project based on findings from a broad 
survey to identify the most appropriate schools to target, which involved topics such as 
discrimination towards minority groups and acceptance of cultural difference. Ten high 
schools were subsequently chosen and representatives visit each institution to discuss issues 
such as peace, tolerance, multiculturalism and pluralism. Student engagement and 
constructive discussions are facilitated through a specially designed board game, sets of which 
are left at each school for ongoing use in civic education classes. Wahid Foundation research 
has indicated that support for jihadi organisations among Indonesian youth is low, but levels 
of intolerance and instances of hate speech have been increasing. 
The University of Indonesia’s Research Centre for Police Studies (PRIK), headed by 
Professor of Psychology, Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, also engages young people and has held 
seminars in ten universities across the country. Prof. Sarlito’s team works with a network of 
former extremists/terrorists – some in prison and others who are reintegrating with society. 
An appropriate individual is selected to visit each university and discuss their life choices in 
order to sway young audiences away from similar pathways. A comparable approach is 
adopted by Aliansi Indonesia Damai (AIDA), an organisation established to support victims 
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of violence and work towards countering violent extremism. However, AIDA involves both 
reformed extremists and victims of terrorist attacks in their school seminars and activities. 
At the time of writing, AIDA had reached out to well over 3000 youths in schools 
across Indonesia. A day’s activities generally begin with a ceremony and ice-breaking games. 
Students are then divided into roughly five groups and asked to discuss conceptual questions 
aimed at eliciting what they value in life. After group feedback with facilitators, the former 
militants and victims present their stories and take questions. According to AIDA programme 
officer, Laode Arham, students are initially fascinated by the former militants, who receive 
much of the early focus and questioning. Attention then shifts to the victims; students ask how 
they can forgive people who have caused them such pain and destruction. Finally the seminars 
are concluded with messages aimed at promoting peace and the importance of responding to 
injustice through more constructive means than violence. Over the past three years 29 victims 
and four former terrorists have been involved in seminars. AIDA revisits schools to evaluate 
their programme’s impact and largely receives positive feedback. The project has so far been 
single-session but plans are in place to follow up with more regular interactions among the 
young people initially engaged. 
The Indonesian chapter of the United States based peace organisation Search for 
Common Ground (SFCG) also conducts CVE initiatives in schools and universities. SFCG 
currently visits 14 universities and 13 public high schools in ten cities across Java and 
Sulawesi, with programmes focusing on promoting dialogue, leadership training, and conflict 
management skills. A key feature of SFCG’s approach is empowering students to make short 
films or documentaries about their lives with regard to tolerance and pluralism. The 
organisation provides video production equipment and training, students post their films on 
YouTube, and SFCG runs competitions to select the best submissions. A recent winner told 
the story of a campus-based initiative to unite different Islamic organisations through sports.  
SFCG also encourages students to come up with their own projects that foster unity and 
discussion. At Universitas General Sudirman in the Central Java city of Purwokerto, the 












resulting Paduka FM has since proven a local success story, with presenters discussing issues 
such as how to square identity with personal passions and pursuits. The presenters attempt to 
bridge differences and rectify misperceptions; for example, young women in Java who wear 
the niqab may well have an active social life and attend music festivals, which is considered 
contrary to common perception. 
A Muhammadiyah4 based organisation called the Maarif Institute undertakes similar 
projects. Following research designed to map out the landscape of schools affected by 
radicalism/extremism, Maarif identified relevant institutions in Cianjur and Banten in West 
Java, and Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo) in Central Java. According to Maarif practitioners, 
engagement can be difficult as some of the schools are run by administrations with extremist 
leanings and allow radical groups to access their students through extra curricula activities. 
One school in Cianjur rejected the Maarif Institute’s efforts to engage its staff and students, 
and attempted to convince other schools in the area to follow suit.  
The mainstay of Maarif’s activities is an annual youth camp which has been running 
for the past four years. Select students from the schools above are invited to attend a week-
long outdoor camp, featuring Maarif textbooks on ‘character building’, with twelve thematic 
chapters: faith, curiosity, honesty, justice, positive thinking, empathy, mutual assistance, 
friendship, tolerance, democracy, patriotism, and amar ma’ruf nahi mugkar (roughly: doing 
good and avoiding bad) (Maarif 2014). The camp also involves outdoor activities, and 
meetings with people from the nation’s six official religions.5 Maarif representatives 
described the initiative as “experiential learning” which aims to promote empathy among its 
participants.  
During camp activities, appropriate candidates are identified and invited to join the 
Maarif Institute’s Peace Journalism Workshop, which runs annually for three days in Jakarta. 
The goal is to strengthen the media literacy of participants, particularly with regard to social 
media, how material is spread on Facebook, and how youth can be more critical of what they 
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see and read online. Participants are also encouraged to produce creative content for counter-
messaging campaigns. Maarif representatives said the Islamic State has thousands ofTwitter 
accounts, so it was important to create as many accounts as possible to spread messages 
denouncing their extremist ideology. Maarif’s Peace Journalism Workshop has a number of 
corporate sponsors, including major media outlets such as Metro TV, Kompas and Antara. 
Participants contribute to the production of Maarif video productions, such as the feature 
length film Mata Tertutup (The Blindfold), which tells three interwoven stories of young 
Indonesians dealing with extremist recruitment and radicalisation.  
Given the rise in sophistication and size of the Islamic State’s propaganda output, the 
BNPT’s deputy one has also now established a media wing known as Pusat Media Damai 
(Centre for Media Peace). According to a senior BNPT official, each FKPT chapter was 
tasked with producing a short film about an issue related to countering extremism or 
intolerance. A panel from deputy one reviewed the submissions in early 2017 and selected the 
best ten to be distributed nationally, both online and in cinemas. The initiative is remarkably 
similar to those already undertaken by SFCG and the Maarif Institute which illustrates the 
unfortunate disconnection between state and non-state CVE efforts. Imitation may be sincere 
flattery but cooperation would seem a more constructive approach.  
 
Secondary Interventions 
In recent years a number of nations have introduced mechanisms for identifying 
individuals that may be on a pathway of radicalisation to violence, and channelling them into 
programmes involving social workers, mentors, psychologists, and/or religious figures. 
Indonesia does not have this type of system. It has been considered unlikely that the 
Indonesian Government would introduce a similar approach because of the expected public 
outcry against pre-crime interventions perceived as stigmatising Islam. This is also prevents 
the closure of problematic schools, an official system of registration for imams in mosques, 












Yet calls for such interventions among government officials have begun to emerge. In 
November 2016, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs General 
Wiranto stated that Indonesian authorities required the power to intervene at the pre-crime 
stage: “In Indonesia, [radicalised individuals yet to commit a crime] cannot be caught. We 
have to wait for him to act before we can act. We can catch him only after he has already 
claimed a life. To prevent such a situation and to ensure that security authorities can catch the 
person before he pulls off such nefarious act, the law must be immediately revised" (Tempo 
19/11/16). 
Despite the absence of legislation permitting this type of intervention, occasional ad 
hoc efforts take place when young people are identified as possessing problematic 
convictions. A BNPT official described the case of a young teen-aged girl whose mother 
became concerned and called the authorities. Representatives from the BNPT then arranged 
weekly meetings with the girl in attempts to soften her views and promote more positive life 
choices. However, it was difficult to ascertain exactly what took place in these meetings or 
whether they would be ongoing.  
A recent initiative from the BNPT, which civil society observers perceive to be 
generally constructive, is engaging the families of individuals convicted of terrorism charges. 
Not only do families often have to survive while their major breadwinner is behind bars, but 
they also face stigmatisation in their communities for links to terrorism. The BNPT offers a 
degree of support in the hope that financial assistance may prevent families turning to 
extremist groups for help, and to ensure that children or younger brothers and sisters do not 
follow in the footsteps of their imprisoned kin. Befriending families is seen as a good way of 
engaging prisoners as it incentivises dialogue with the authorities; family visits and support 
are used as leverage when attempting to persuade inmates to cooperate.  
The Maarif Institute has worked more specifically with individuals identified as 
having particularly hard-line views. During the institute’s 2016 youth camp, ten students 
(eight boys and two girls of 16-17 years old) refused to participate in activities aimed at 












declined a church visit so Maarif camp facilitators took them aside to discuss their reasons for 
rejecting the dialogue. When the students said they were unwilling to enter a different 
religion’s place of worship, the facilitators pointed out that the iconic 9th-century Borobudur 
complex in central Java (which many of the group had visited) was a Buddhist temple, so why 
should they not also visit a Christian church. Through this type of discussion, Maarif 
representatives said they felt progress had been made in terms of opening the teenagers’ 





Prisons and Inmate Management  
As of late 2016, there were roughly 230 inmates convicted of terrorism charges spread 
out among some 70 prisons throughout the archipelago, but predominantly in Java, Sumatra 
and Sulawesi. According to representatives from the Directorate General of Corrections 
(DGC), this dispersal system was a “situational strategy”. The priority was to keep prisoners 
close to their families as regular visits created better conditions for potential rehabilitation. 
However, a recent report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) offers an 
additional reason: while cooperative prisoners may be held near their families, others are 
spread out to facilitate monitoring and to restrict problematic visitations (IPAC 2016: 1). 
Inmates assisting with ongoing investigations are housed in prisons within proximity to the 
relevant security agency.  
Terrorist prisoners in Indonesia can largely be put into one of two groups: those who 
have declared allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and refuse to cooperate, and those who 
consider IS too brutal and quick to apply takfir to other Muslims, who are more pragmatic 
about how they choose to engage with the authorities. Each side can be broken down into 












ideologically sophisticated but are intent on violence; and followers, who may be more 
peripherally involved in the movement and convicted for supporting roles. 
 
De-radicalisation  
Despite ad hoc efforts from various government and non-government stakeholders 
over the past several years, there is still no coherent, coordinated multi-stakeholder prison-
based programme to rehabilitate inmates convicted of terrorism charges in Indonesia. The 
DGC runs regular programmes which are mostly the same as for the general prison 
population, only with occasional extra classes promoting tolerance. NGOs have experimented 
with personal approaches to disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence, and have 
worked towards building the capacity of prison staff to manage problematic inmates. The 
BNPT has for the past few years run various ‘de-radicalisation’ initiatives in prisons, though 
observers criticise their efforts for being overly ambitious in their focus on ideology, and for 
lacking commitment and consistency in particular.  
The BNPT’s current approach can be traced back to its 2013 internal publication, the 
Blueprint Deradikalisasi (De-radicalisation Blueprint), which was “expected to serve as a 
guide for all agencies involved in the prevention and control of radical understanding” in 
Indonesia, but was far too general to offer any actual direction (BNPT 2013: 119). The 
Blueprint defines de-radicalisation as “any effort to transform radical beliefs or ideology to 
non-radical ones, with multi and interdisciplinary approaches”, through four stages: 
“Identification, rehabilitation, re-education and re-socialisation” (BNPT 2013: 8). 
Identification involves interviewing prisoners to determine their level of involvement, 
ideological understanding, and affiliations. This initial stage highlights how little is often 
known about some of the convicted terrorism offenders, which is not helped by the general 
reluctance to share information between relevant state agencies. 
The rehabilitation and re-education stages comprise “ideological moderation … 
carried out through dialogue and a persuasive approach”, yet the language used in the 












whether they are applied personally or to groups (BNPT 2013: 69). The blueprint’s 
descriptions of the rehabilitation and re-education stages are actually the same – the first two 
paragraphs of the latter are paraphrased versions of the former, while the final three 
paragraphs of each stage are carbon copies. The only apparent difference is that in the re-
education stage, prisoners are isolated from those who may negatively influence them. This 
has not always been possible given Indonesia’s overcrowded prison system. However, in 
February 2017 a new secure facility in Sentul, south of Jakarta, was opened, which has 
enabled the BNPT to separate a small number of cooperative prisoners nearing the end of 
their sentences, and proceed with a more focused course of “re-education” interventions.  
The BNPT discovered early on that attempting to argue away ideology was difficult. 
An official from the de-radicalisation division explained that the approach was subsequently 
altered to initially focus on developing relationships with prisoners through informal 
conversations and family visits. A common criticism among observers, however, is that 
BNPT visits tend to be infrequent and inconsistent, impeding the state agency’s ability to 
build relationships of trust. Prison officers who wished to remain anonymous revealed that the 
BNPT used to bring gifts to entice prisoners to participate, but jealousy among other inmates 
forced them to give prisoners cash as it was easier to hide from cell mates. Another observer 
said the BNPT sometimes made false promises regarding post-release job opportunities and 
financial support, which has bred resentment and mistrust. It was also claimed that some 
current and recently released prisoners “see the BNPT as an ATM” and play along with 
programmes merely to reap the benefits. 
In 2013, the BNPT invited three clerics from the Middle East to visit Cipinang Prison 
in Jakarta and Pasir Putih Prison on Nusakambangan Island to hold discussions with terrorist 
inmates. The sessions reportedly lasted three hours in each prison, and according to IPAC, the 
conversations were “lively” but senior prisoners in Cipinang said the conversations had had 
no effect on their views (IPAC 2014: 8). Similar to the FKPT meetings, the visiting clerics 
represent an inconsistent, top-down approach to counter radicalisation. If programmes are to 












based on the needs of a given individual. A few lectures – no matter how inspiring – are 














NGO prison-based efforts 
Non-governmental organisations also conduct programmes in prisons throughout the 
country, aimed at both disengaging prisoners from violence and training officers to deal more 
effectively with terrorist inmates. From 2010, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) conducted 
short programmes in roughly 20 prisons across Indonesia aimed at promoting conflict 
management. SFCG makes a point not to address ideology or religion, but instead focuses on 
empathy, tolerance and cooperation, while mixing terrorist inmates with other high-risk 
prisoners to avoid stigmatisation. One activity described by an SFCG representative is a role-
play game in which two groups must negotiate over ten oranges at a market; both need the 
fruit but for different reasons, and if they conduct constructive dialogue they may reach a 
solution in which both parties are satisfied. SFCG has also trained prison guards, as well as a 
series of workshops on human rights delivered to the police counterterrorism unit, Densus 88. 
Radical Skateboarders 
An interesting project that developed organically within Indonesia’s largest prison, 
Cipinang, involved the construction of a modest skateboard park in the wing designated for 
terrorism offenders. In 2015, a founding member of the Indonesian skateboard federation 
was sentenced to five years in prison for drug trafficking and later that year he decided that 
skateboarding might prove a positive pastime for the uncooperative terrorist inmates. After 
receiving permission from the guards and donations from skateboarding friends on the 
outside, he set about building a ramp and grind box with help from fellow inmates. Once 
completed, the activity became a hit with both terrorist offenders and general inmates. 
Prison officers described the emergence of an encouraging dynamic; skateboarding 
facilitated interaction and provided an outlet for positive self-expression. Eventually the 
leader of the pro-IS group became incensed that his followers were associating with a drug 
dealer and an infidel pastime and declared a fatwa against the sport, forcing his men to 
stop. The anti-IS terrorism offenders are still involved, however, and Cipinang skateboard 
sessions appear to provide a constructive sense of belonging that does not rely on a 













Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP) is another small dedicated Indonesian NGO 
doing similar work and has four programmes conducted in cooperation with the DGC. The 
first is working to empower the capacity of prison officers to manage the psychological and 
ideological features of their relationships with extremist inmates, and the capacity of parole 
officers to assist former prisoners’ transitions back into society. YPP’s second programme 
attempts to address a difficult issue: how to engage hard line supporters of IS who are self-
contained and antagonistic towards group outsiders. The idea is to get cooperative terrorist 
inmates to work with the more hardened ideologues and militants in order to slowly soften 
their positions, so they may be open to further dialogue. Cooperative prisoners are trained in 
effective strategies to engage their cell mates, and YPP is experimenting with this initiative in 
two prisons: Pasir Putih on Nusakambangan Island, and Porong Prison near the East Java city 
of Surabaya.  
YPP also works directly with current and former prisoners to promote positive 
pathways away from old networks. Participants are taught how to develop business plans for 
small start-ups such as catfish farms or electronic repair businesses, and receive assistance 
with applying for further education while in prison. YPP practitioners believe that attempts to 
change prisoners’ religious and political convictions (or indeed to replace them with the state 
ideology) are overly ambitious and can even be counterproductive as subjects may become 
further entrenched when their positions are threatened (see Brehm 1966; Dalgaard-Nielsen 
2013; Braddock 2014). De-radicalisation is rather seen as a long-term, personal process, and 
the small organisation considers their most effective role to be providing seeds and 
opportunities for disengagement from the violent social networks to which the inmates 
belong. YPP also works closely with the families of inmates, offering support and 
encouraging engagement with their communities. 
A recent promising rehabilitation initiative comes from Aliansi Indonesia Damai 
(AIDA) which has started to expand its victims’ voices programme to carefully planned 
dialogues within prisons. AIDA considers meetings between victims and terrorist prisoners to 












However, the organisation is acutely aware of the potential for damaging dynamics and takes 
care to select appropriate candidates for discussions, as well as psychologically preparing 
victims for the encounters.  
As of April 2017, AIDA had conducted one-on-one meetings in five different prisons 
which were viewed as productive. In Cipinang, a prisoner was curious about the aftermath of 
a particular attack, to which the victim replied with detailed descriptions of his pain and the 
ongoing emotional strain on his family. Eventually the victim gained more confidence and 
began to show documents such as photos and hospital records. It was described as highly 
emotional with both participants in tears by the end of the meeting. AIDA hope to expand this 
initiative but emphasise the importance of properly negotiating the sensitivities involved in 
setting up such meetings. For this reason, the organisation’s management also stress the need 
for dialogues to remain a civil society endeavour. 
The University of Indonesia’s Research Centre for Police Studies (PRIK) is another 
organisation which has run prison-based programmes. Since 2009, PRIK has been working 
with prisoners and individuals on parole, in what the centre initially considered to be de-
radicalisation, as the goal was to change individual mind sets. Professor Sarlito Wirawan 
Sarwono explained that in the early days, PRIK invited religious scholars to converse with 
prisoners but soon realised that the clerics’ arguments were swiftly rejected. The team then 
built up relationships slowly, beginning with daily problems, families, and life in prison. They 
then moved onto broader issues such as social welfare, governance and corruption, and finally 
began to address politics and religion, often by highlighting peaceful channels for activism 
and the ineffectiveness of violence to achieve their desired goals. As of September 2016, 
PRIK was working with roughly 150 individuals, some of whom were still in prison while 
most were reintegrating with society. 
 
Remissions and Assessments 
In mid-November 2016, a man linked to the Islamic State attempted to detonate a 












Jakarta Post 14/11/16). After arriving at the scene on his motorbike he accidentally dropped 
the device, which rolled away and exploded, killing one two-year-old girl and badly injuring 
three other young children (IPAC 2016: 8). The man was identified as Juhanda, alias Jo bin 
Muhammad Aceng Kurnia, who had been released from prison in 2014, four months before 
the end of a three-and-a-half-year sentence for his role in mail bomb attacks in 2011 (IPAC 
2016: 6). Juhanda was the third recidivist to commit an attack in 2016. Sunakim, alias Afif, a 
gunman in the January 2016 Thamrin attack in Jakarta, had been released from prison five 
months before the assault, in August 2015, for good behaviour. His original sentence would 
have kept him behind bars until 2017. Another assailant in the same operation, Muhammad 
Ali, had also reportedly served time in prison for robbing a bank to fund terrorism in 2010 
(Tempo 31/1/16). 
Despite successfully prosecuting over a thousand individuals on terrorism charges 
since the first Bali bomb and having them pass through the prison system, the Indonesian 
government has not developed a workable pre-release risk assessment instrument for 
terrorism offenders. In fact, it has allegedly been the case that prison authorities sometimes 
know very little about the terrorist prisoners they hold, as information is not readily shared 
between agencies. President Joko Widodo has stressed the importance of stronger 
international counterterrorism cooperation (Parlina 2015; Benar News 22/5/17), but it appears 
that a more immediate priority should be to build trust between (and even within) Indonesian 
state institutions and agencies working on counterterrorism. 
In the surprising absence of a robust system for assessing the risk posed by prisoners 
prior to release, or even the availability of detailed biographical information that might inform 
their effective management in prison, the DGC has been working with the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), which has a small team based in 
Jakarta. The DGC had in place a general parole assessment tool known as Penelitian 
Kemasyarakatan (LITMAS), and UNICRI’s leading project officer decided the best approach 












relevant for terrorist prisoners. This proved to be an effective approach and the initiative was 
making positive progress by early 2017. 
The assessment tool is part of a broader Grand Design and Road Map for the Handling 
of High Risk prisoners in Indonesia, which involves updated general rehabilitation strategies, 
counselling, and increased community participation in the penitentiary system (DGC-UNICRI 
2017). At the time of writing the document was under review by the Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights. The LITMAS tool for prisoners convicted of terrorism offences includes two 
parts, which will be used both for pre-release assessment and the profiling of inmates for 
more effective management throughout their sentences. The first concentrates on emotional 
issues such as anger, frustration and the potential for violent behaviour upon release (this will 
also be employed to assess other high-risk prisoners). The second attempts to determine an 
individual’s knowledge and support for extremist ideologies, including views on key concepts 
in militant jihadism, such as takfir and thagout.  
Prison officers will be trained to implement the test as budget constraints limit the 
possibility of employing qualified psychologists. The UNICRI officer remarked that the DGC 
employs 35,000 prison officers and that 10-20 of the most suitable would be selected and 
given intensive training. Several officers have extensive experience with terrorist inmates and 
in many cases have taken it upon themselves to learn more about the relevant issues so they 
can manage relationships more effectively. Training from NGOs such as YPP and SFCG has 
also helped to increase capacity in this regard. While prison officers may not fully grasp the 
psychological theories involved in more complex risk assessment tools, their personal 
experience in dealing with Indonesian extremists inside prisons on a daily basis could prove a 
more valuable qualification.  
 
Post-Release Monitoring and Reintegration 
The three recidivists who staged deadly attacks in 2016 (and one more in early 2017) 
shone a spotlight on prison programme and risk assessment shortcomings. They have also 












their effective reintegration back into society. Juhanda had become involved with pro-ISIS 
inmates in Tangerang Prison because he received no visits and his extremist cell mates 
became his de-facto family. Once released, the only people he could turn to for support were 
pro-ISIS groups, and after a short stay in South Sulawesi, Juhanda moved to Samarinda where 
he stayed at the ISIS-linked Mujahidin Mosque (IPAC 2016: 6). This experienced further 
radicalised the former prisoner and led to the eventual attack on the Oikumene Church 
(Tempo 14/11/16). The DGC is responsible for the surveillance of released high-risk 
prisoners, but for those convicted of terrorism it relies on assistance from the BNPT.  
An essential feature of a prisoner’s post-release pathway is ensuring that it leads away 
from former networks and towards constructive goals which enable them to reintegrate with 
their communities. As there have been hundreds of released extremist prisoners re-entering 
society in Indonesia over the past decade or so, reintegration has become a priority and 
several of the stakeholders mentioned above are involved. For the BNPT’s deputy one, 
reintegration or “resocialisation” is the fourth phase of a prisoners “de-radicalisation”. There 
does not appear to be a systematic approach to assisting former prisoners, and after talking to 
those either working on these initiatives or observing them, the BNPT’s reintegration work 
appears to be ad hoc and insufficient.  
According to one interviewee who wished to remain anonymous, “the BNPT lacks 
commitment in implementing their programmes … [they say] if you join our so-called de-
radicalisation programme you can have many benefits – you can have a bakso (noodle soup) 
or murtabak (omelette) cart – we will support you. So the radicals join the programme, but 
again, execution is the problem – there is no BNPT to find!” Another participant argued that 
“ex-offenders don’t trust the BNPT” because they “promise money, promise jobs and this sort 
of thing, but then it never happens. It can be dangerous”. 
Given that most employers are likely to view a candidate’s history of violent 
extremism with suspicion, many former terrorist prisoners seek opportunities to start their 
own small business after being released. YPP is one organisation that places emphasis on this 












funding for small start-ups. Proposed businesses include fish farms or other domestic animal 
breeding set ups, electrical repair shops, and traditional medicine dealerships. AIDA’s Laode 
Arham said he had been in contact that day with a former prisoner who was looking for Rp.15 
million (US$1100) to start up a catfish breeding business. Laode explained that funding had 
come from a range of sources but securing financial assistance continued to be difficult. 
Another popular avenue for released prisoners is to become motorbike taxi drivers. 
Such industries are under-regulated in Indonesia, but the one essential requisite is a valid 
Indonesian driver’s license, which most former terrorist prisoners do not have and have 
struggled to obtain. Siti Aliah from YPP said this had changed after a group of formerly 
convicted extremists filed a complaint with the police counterterrorism unit, Densus 88, and 
officers eventually helped them navigate the bureaucracy. A disruptive mobile application 
(similar to Uber) known as Gojek has revolutionised the motorbike taxi industry in Indonesia, 
and now offers a range of other options, from food and massage delivery to cleaning and 
repair services. A number of former extremists are apparently now working for this company, 
though it is unclear whether Gojek are aware that former extremists are among their squadron 
of drivers. 
One obstacle faced by former extremist prisoners attempting to reintegrate back into 
Indonesian society is the broad stigmatisation they receive from community members. The 
BNPT’s Blueprint states that “the most important thing” is that resocialisation efforts “remove 
suspicion and fear on one hand and develop empathy and mutual respect on the other” (BNPT 
2013: 84). While these are objectively constructive goals, it is not clear how much work goes 
into preparing communities to receive returning prisoners. In March 2017, the BNPT admitted 
that over 400 former terrorist offenders had played no part in its post-release de-radicalisation 
programmes (The Jakarta Post 2/3/17). Participation is entirely voluntary but this startling 
lack of attendance suggests a different approach or incentive structure will be required to have 
more former inmates involved in government-led reintegration efforts. 
Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono and his team have had experience with the issue of 












could do was to try and show the families of returning extremist prisoners how to modify their 
lifestyles and actions so they could mingle with mainstream society. “Otherwise”, he said, 
“The children are not accepted in local schools, because they are the children of terrorists”. 
Prof. Sarlito added that often stigmatisation was a product of clumsy surveillance and 
arguably unnecessary warnings given to neighbours about potential threats. Laode Arham 
described a recent case in which a former extremist was struggling to reintegrate with a 
community in Ambon, Maluku Province, because he was held with suspicion. AIDA sent 
people to intervene, and because the local government, police and communities knew the 
NGO as a peace organisation, people agreed to give the individual in question a chance to 
prove himself. This is a lucid example of a grass-roots organisation possessing the required 




The 2013 De-radicalisation Blueprint was intended to be a guide for all stakeholders 
but the document was far too general to offer any actionable instruction. For any coordinated 
rehabilitation strategy to meet success it will be essential to create detailed profiles of the 
prisoners concerned, which outline their backgrounds and affiliations, while attempting to 
ascertain their degree of ideological conviction and support for violence. Prisoner progress 
could be assessed throughout their sentences and the collected data would then inform levels 
of post-release monitoring and the type of reintegration assistance required in each case. 
There are different parties currently working on such a system, including the BNPT as part of 
the Blueprint’s “identification” phase, but these efforts are not coordinated and information is 
apparently not readily shared between the relevant stakeholders.  
Some prisoners convicted of terrorism in Indonesia are relatively educated and from 
urban middle-class families; others have a rural background, a primary education, and limited 
life skills. Some are in their 50s, others in their 20s, and there are at least two teenagers in 












unlikely to succeed. Tailoring individual interventions may be resource intensive, but if all 
relevant and interested parties – both state and non-state – were brought together and directed 
effectively, it may be possible to provide more compatible programmes. Prisoners are more 
likely to engage if they believe their specific issues are being addressed.  
State-led primary interventions to counter violent extremism in Indonesia have similar 
drawbacks to prison-based efforts. The FKPT forums may cover much of the country, but 
meetings are insufficiently targeted and largely top-down exercises which make inefficient 
use of resources. As with tertiary interventions, the BNPT could take a directing role where 
they conduct in-depth research to identify which areas of the country are particularly 
vulnerable and then determine the specific assistance needed in order to counter the respective 
problem. Various government institutions would then play a role depending on the issue, as 
would non-governmental and civil society organisations, which have the requisite legitimacy 
to engage individuals and communities drifting astray from society.  
Organised secondary interventions are currently not possible in Indonesia due to the 
likely backlash from religious organisations if individuals were seen to be sanctioned solely 
for their views. Recent comments such as those of General Wiranto in November 2016 
suggest this may change, however, and it is therefore a possibility that provisions for pre-
crime interventions are included in the new counterterrorism bill currently making its way 
through parliament. The form and substance of the updated legislation will be pivotal for the 
approach to CVE that Indonesia takes over the next several years.  
The BNPT has stated that coordinating initiatives to counter or prevent violent 
extremism is problematic and difficult. Among state institutions this is understandable as 
there will inevitably be overlapping and competing interests. On the other hand, coordinating 
non-governmental and civil society organisations already working on CVE is more 
straightforward, and the BNPT should make better use of these resources. The BNPT’s 2013 
Blueprint states: 
In the context of implementing the de-radicalization program and fostering 












governmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs are vital assets that are entrusted to 
strengthen democracy ... In the field of de-radicalization, NGOs can serve as 
strategic partners to government to actively conduct research, training, advocacy, 
mentoring, promotion of human rights, civic education, promotion of tolerance and 
pluralism, strengthening of civil society, facilitating of dialogue and so forth with 
the purpose of building and strengthening democracy by instilling religious and 
nationalistic understanding, which is tolerant, peaceful, and open. (BNPT 2013: 
113) 
 
There has since been intermittent engagement between the state counterterrorism agency and 
non-governmental stakeholders, particularly with Nahdlatul Ulama organisations such as the 
Wahid Foundation. But for the most part, and despite its promising statement in the 2013 
Blueprint, the BNPT has actually appeared to “ignore the active participation” of NGOs. It 
would certainly be a stretch to suggest the BNPT considers the small committed organisations 
described above to be “strategic partners”.  
It is unclear exactly what is preventing more constructive collaboration but potential 
cooperation is not helped by differing perspectives regarding CVE. The government appears 
to favour a more ideological persuasive approach, attempting to replace an individual’s desire 
to live under a caliphate with an acceptance of the Indonesian state philosophy, Pancasila, and 
a promise to become a good citizen. Civil society groups prefer to challenge justifications for 
indiscriminate violence, encourage personal development among prisoners, and to promote 
peace, tolerance and pluralism among young people.  
If an organisation can be regarded as an extreme extension of a governing authority’s 
ideology then the state is well-placed to promote moderation and the cessation of violence to 
achieve political goals. But when an extremist has internalised convictions of fundamentally 
changing the status quo and overthrowing a government through a campaign of terrorist 












People in prison for subversive violence or those thought to be treading a path toward 
a similar end will harbour fundamentally anti-establishment attitudes, and any persuasive 
attempt by the state to transform them back into proud citizens is likely to be met with 
resistance. Unaligned with government, civil society organisations are not hindered by such 
accusations nor rebuked for grievances stemming from state policies at home and/or abroad. 
NGOs often have deep community roots which provide a degree of legitimacy that can be 
leveraged to engage individuals who are mistrustful of institutional power. The challenge for 
the Indonesian government is to figure out how to make use of these valuable resources 
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